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An Empirical Study of Home User Intentions towards Computer Security 
Abstract 
Home computer users are solely responsible for 
implementing security measures on their devices. 
Although most computers have security software 
installed, the potential remains for security breaches, 
which makes it important for home users to take 
additional steps, such as not sharing one’s password 
and using strong passwords, to secure their devices 
further. Drawing on protection motivation theory and 
findings from prior research, this study evaluates 
factors that influence individuals to implement 
additional security measures to protect their home 
computers. Using SmartPLS and responses from 72 
home computer users, the results show that response 
efficacy, self-efficacy and subjective norms were 
significant in encouraging persons to implement 
additional security measures. Maladaptive rewards 
on the other hand acted as a significant detractor, 
while neither perceived vulnerability nor perceived 
severity was significant in relation to willingness to 
implement additional security measures.  
1. Introduction
Home computers have become an ideal breeding 
ground for hacking, distributing, or holding sensitive 
information to ransom [1] Although home computers 
are sold with a base level of security, this is not 
always enough. To reduce the potential for security 
breaches, it is important that people take additional 
steps to secure their devices. These can include 
simple steps such as using strong passwords or 
backing up their data, and exercising caution when 
installing new applications or programs on a home 
computer or laptop. However, people often do not 
follow the advice of experts and take additional to 
secure their devices, resulting in a low level of 
security of home computing devices [1].  
Understanding the home setting is important. 
Today many persons use personal devices for work 
related purposes. As more companies engage with 
individuals online, this results in a large amount of 
sensitive information being stored on personal 
computers (including documents related to banking 
and insurance), making it increasingly important to 
secure these devices. Most studies of information 
systems (IS) security however, have been in 
organizational settings [1, 2]. This research may not 
generalize readily to the home context due to 
differences such as the role of training, and the 
presence of sanctions and policies in organizations 
that govern compliance [1]. Hence it is important to 
examine the home setting, and understand how to 
motivate people to take extra steps to protect their 
home computers [3]. 
To address the research aim, this study draws 
primarily on Protection Motivation Theory [4] which 
has been successfully used to explain attitudes 
towards IS security compliance in organizations [5], 
as well as the protective security behaviors of home 
computer users [6]. The PMT assumes that the 
motivators behind protecting something is a result of 
a person’s assessment of the perceived severity of a 
threat, probability of the threat occurring, the efficacy 
of the response behavior, and the confidence level in 
their ability to act upon the threat [4, 7]. The PMT is 
further extended by incorporating subjective norms 
(from the Theory of Reasoned Action) which has 
been commonly cited in the PMT literature as 
significant in explaining an individual’s intention 
behind taking security –related actions [9, 10, 11] 
This paper reports on a study that investigates 
peoples’ willingness to take additional protective 
measures to secure their home computers. By 
improving our understanding of people’s beliefs 
about the protection of home computers, this study 
aims to provide insights that can usefully inform 
computer service providers and other organizations 
on how to design better support services and improve 
home computer security.  
2. Prior Research
With the recognition that many security breaches 
are directly or indirectly caused by failure to comply 
with security policies, much of the early research on 
motivations regarding computer security has been in 
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the organizational context. With the rise in home 
computer use, individuals who own personal 
computers are also becoming more vulnerable to 
security breaches [12]. Therefore, it is important that 
they too apply security measures on their computers 
to reduce the potential for security breaches to occur 
[13]. This study aims to address this need. 
Studies have used various theories to identify the 
factors influencing computer security behaviors [2]. 
The PMT in particular has been used in studies of IS 
security; these have found constructs that form threat 
and coping appraisals have significant impacts on the 
intention of individuals to take preventative computer 
security measures at work [5, 9, 10], and at home [2, 
6, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. There have been mixed 
findings. For example, some found constructs such as 
perceived vulnerability to be significant [5], while 
others did not [15]. Others have focused on 
incorporating factors from other theories such as 
social influence from the Theory of Reasoned Action 
to better explain intention [2, 6, 9 13]. 
In the home context, most studies using the PMT 
focus on general security behaviors [2, 13, 17, 18, 
20], or specific protective behaviors such as adoption 
of security on home wireless networks [19] or the use 
of password management systems [17]. However, 
what these studies do not address are the additional 
steps that people are encouraged to take to protect 
their devices and their data, and stay safe when they 
are online (e.g. not sharing their passwords with 
others, using different passwords for different devices 
and accounts, and backing up one’s data) [21]. Thus 
the focus of this research is to bridge this gap by 
examining peoples’ motivations to go beyond the 
basics and take additional steps to protect their home 
computers from threats. 
 
3. Research Model 
 
3.1 Protection Motivation Theory  
 
Prior research has used many theories to examine 
protective behaviors. These include the Theory of 
Reasoned Action, the Theory of Planned Behavior 
and the Protection Motivation Theory. Of these, 
Protection Motivation Theory is particularly relevant 
to this study because of its explicit consideration of a 
threat and one’s ability to cope with it.  
Grounded in healthcare, Protection Motivation 
Theory (PMT) was developed to identify the 
cognitive processes that an individual faces when 
exposed to a threat [4]. According to the PMT [4, 7], 
protection motivation arises from consideration of a 
potential threat and one’s desire to avoid the 
consequences of the threat. This involves two main 
cognitive processes – a threat appraisal and a coping 
appraisal. The threat appraisal identifies and 
evaluates the threat in terms of the perceived severity 
of and vulnerability to the threat, coupled with one’s 
assessment of the rewards (i.e. maladaptive rewards) 
that may arise from not taking protective actions. 
This means that even if a threat is perceived as likely 
and its impact severe, if the rewards for not taking an 
action are high enough this will negate the protective 
action.  
Once an individual evaluates the threat, the 
coping appraisal follows. This consists of an 
assessment of response efficacy, self-efficacy and 
response costs. Response efficacy refers to the 
perceived effectiveness of reducing the threat, whilst 
self-efficacy refers to an individual’s confidence in 
carrying out the responding protective action against 
the threat [2, 4]. The response costs are the costs 
incurred when performing the protective behavior, 
such as time, money, and overheads [4, 6, 14]. 
Overall, in the coping appraisal, the response efficacy 
and self-efficacy must be greater than the response 
costs for a protective action to be taken [7].  
 
3.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
The PMT states that if an individual assesses the 
perceived severity of a threat to be high, they are 
more likely to take protective actions to mitigate the 
threat [7]. In a study with psychology students high 
and low levels of threat severity were manipulated by 
displaying an unexpected virus warning message 
while participants browsed a website [14]. The 
findings showed that participants who were exposed 
to the high levels of severity were more likely to 
install anti malware. Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan 
[15] and Yoon et al. [11] also studied the protective 
computing behaviors amongst university students and 
found that severity positively impacted intention to 
take protective actions. Turning to home computer 
use, Jansen and van Schaik [6] and Woon et al. [19] 
both found a positive and significant relationship 
between severity and protective computing 
behaviors. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Perceived severity is positively related to 
intention to implement additional security 
measures. 
 
When an individual perceives they are vulnerable 
to security incidents, he/she is more likely to adopt 
computer security measures (e.g. installing protective 
software) to mitigate the risk. Vulnerability has 
commonly been found to influence the intention to 
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comply with security policies in an organizational 
context [9, 14]. However, these findings have been 
less consistent in relation to home computer security. 
While Jansen and van Schaik [6] and Woon et al. 
[19] found insignificant relationships between 
vulnerability and intention, in contrast, Thompson et 
al. [13] found that home computer users (individuals) 
who believed they were vulnerable to general 
security threats were more likely to engage in generic 
protective computing behaviors. Given that most 
studies suggest that vulnerability has a significant 
effect on intention, we propose that: 
H2: Perceived vulnerability is positively related to 
implement additional security measures. 
 
Although Rogers [7] recognized the concept of 
perceived rewards arising from not performing a 
behavior, many IS security studies have excluded 
maladaptive rewards [10, 13, 17]. As such, little is 
known as to whether maladaptive rewards from not 
performing a protective behavior impact protection 
motivation [15]. Those that have examined 
maladaptive rewards return mixed findings. For 
example, while Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan [15] 
did not find a significant relationship between 
maladaptive rewards and intention to perform a 
security behavior, consistent with the PMT, others 
studies have found an inverse relationship between 
maladaptive rewards and intention within the IS 
security setting [5, 14]. For example, Boss et al. [14] 
found that maladaptive rewards inversely affected 
intention to comply to online security policies. 
Hence, we propose: 
H3: Maladaptive rewards are inversely related to 
intention to implement additional security 
measures. 
 
The PMT suggests that if an individual believes a 
protective action will mitigate a threat, they are more 
likely to take action [7]. The relationship between 
response efficacy and intention has been consistently 
established in the general IS security literature [6, 9, 
14, 17, 19, 20]. Response efficacy is also commonly 
the strongest variable that predicts the intention to 
perform a protective behavior [9]. For example, 
Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan [15] found that 
response efficacy directly affected intention to 
implement anti malware on personal computing 
devices. Yoon et al. [11] also found that response 
efficacy affected intention to implement general IS 
security measures on personal computers. Hence: 
H4: Response efficacy is positively related to 
intention to implement additional security 
measures. 
If individuals believe they are able to carry out a 
protective behavior effectively, they are more likely 
to perform the behavior [7]. The relationship between 
self-efficacy and intention is supported in many 
studies of protective behaviors including the work 
setting [5, 9, 10, 14], and home computing setting [2, 
6, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. A recent study of home 
users found self-efficacy was important in 
determining personal computing security intentions 
[13]. This finding was also supported by Menard et 
al. [17] who also studied security intentions in a 
home context. Hence it is expected that:  
H5: Self-efficacy is positively related to intention 
to implement additional security measures. 
 
The PMT suggests that if an individual perceives 
the costs of implementing a protective behavior to be 
high, then it is unlikely that the preventative behavior 
will be adopted [7]. Response costs have been 
identified as a context and individual dependent 
construct [9]. As such, the impact of response costs 
may vary across contexts. For example, some studies 
have not found response costs to be significant in the 
organizational context [9; 17]; this may be so because 
factors such as time and money may not carry a 
personal cost to the individual. By contrast, in the 
home context, users are personally responsible for 
any costs and overheads involved in taking protective 
action. For example, a study of home users found that 
users would intend to take precautionary measures to 
secure their home wireless networks if response costs 
were reduced [19]. Similarly, Thompson et al. [13] 
found that response costs were significant in 
determining whether to perform personal computing 
security behaviors. Hence, we propose: 
H6: Response costs are inversely related to 
implement additional security measures. 
 
Subjective norms derive from the Theory of 
Reasoned Action (TRA) [8]. This construct explains 
how social pressures on an individual can cause a 
behavioral response to an event [8]. Although not 
originally included in the PMT [13], this construct is 
commonly cited in PMT literature as explaining an 
individual’s intention behind taking certain security 
actions [10, 11]. In IS security, Ifinedo [9] found that 
the compliance of other employees in organizations 
influenced others to comply also with IS security 
policies. Similarly, Tsai et al. [20] examined the 
online security behaviors of general MTurk users and 
found that the social circle of these users positively 
influenced their computer security behaviors. 
Likewise, we expect that the social circles of the 
participants will impacts intention to take additional 
security steps [8]. Hence we propose that: 
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H7: Subjective norms are positively related to 
implement additional security measures. 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the above hypotheses.  
 
Perceived 
Severity
Perceived 
Vulnerability
Response
Efficacy Self-Efficacy
Response 
Cost
Subjective Norms
Protection 
Motivation
(Intention)
Threat Appraisal
Coping Appraisal
 +H7
Maladaptive 
Reward
 
Figure 1. Research model 
 
4. Methodology 
 
This study surveyed individuals in New Zealand 
who owned a home computer or laptop. A link to the 
online survey hosted by Qualtrics was sent out to 
potential participants via organizational contacts and 
poster advertising on a university campus.  
All items in the survey were adapted from prior 
research (See Table 1). Perceived severity (3 items), 
vulnerability (3 items), response efficacy (3 items), 
response costs (4 items), maladaptive rewards (5 
items), and intention (6 items) were adapted from 
Boss et al. [14]. Self-efficacy (5 items), subjective 
norms (3 items) were adapted from Anderson and 
Agarwal [2] and Thompson et al. [13]. All items were 
measured using 7-point Likert scales anchored as 
“Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.  
This study used the Partial Least Squares 
approach to structural equation modelling (PLS-
SEM) via Smart PLS 3.2.7 (with 500 resamples) to 
evaluate the research model [22]. PLS-SEM is 
suitable particularly for studies focused on prediction 
where the aim is to explain the variance observed in 
the dependent variable, as with this study which 
focuses on understanding protection motivation (i.e. 
operationalized as intention to implement additional 
security measures) [23]. This approach is also 
appropriate when there are many constructs included 
in the research model with the model being relatively 
complex compared to the sample size [23].  
 
Table 1. Sample Items 
Construct Sample Item 
Perceived 
Severity 
If my home computer/laptop was affected 
by a security breach it would cause major 
problems 
Perceived 
Vulnerability 
My home computer/laptop is vulnerable to 
a security breach 
Maladaptive 
Rewards 
Not taking additional security measures to 
protect my home computer/laptop keeps me 
from being confused 
Response 
Efficacy 
Taking additional security measures will be 
effective in protecting my home computer/ 
laptop 
Self-Efficacy I feel comfortable taking additional  
measures to secure my home computer/ 
laptop 
Response 
Costs 
There is too much work associated with 
implementing additional security measures 
on my home computer/laptop 
Subjective 
Norms 
People whose opinions I value think that I 
should take additional security measures to 
protect my home computer/laptop  
Intention 
(Protection 
Motivation) 
I intend to take additional security measures 
to protect my home computer/ laptop   
 
5. Results 
 
Data were collected from 72 persons who 
responded. Of the respondents, 50% were female. 
Most were aged 18 to 34 years old (75%), and had an 
undergraduate (39%) or postgraduate degree (49%). 
The majority had owned their home devices for 5 
years or more (81%); most persons owned a laptop 
only (72%). Most (93%) had read or heard about 
security breaches, and for 65% of the respondents 
their computer had been affected by a security breach 
(e.g. malware, virus).  
The results of the tests of the measurement model 
showed outer loadings ranged from 0.688 to 0.972. 
Composite reliability ranged from 0.873 to 0.962, 
and the average variance extracted (AVE) from 0.697 
to 0.895 (Table 2). Being greater than recommended 
cut-offs of 0.70, 0.70 and 0.50 respectively, these 
satisfied the tests for adequate construct reliability 
and convergence [23]. For discriminant validity, the 
results (Table 2) also showed the square root of the 
AVE values (shown on the diagonals) were greater 
than the correlations among the constructs indicating 
that the constructs were distinct from each other [23].  
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Table 2. Composite Reliability, AVE, and 
Discriminant Validity  
CR AVE PS PV MR RE SE RC SN Int
PS 0.96 0.90 0.95
PV 0.89 0.73 0.35 0.85
MR 0.93 0.74 0.05 0.30 0.86
RE 0.87 0.70 0.37 0.12 0.02 0.84
SE 0.92 0.70 0.24 0.20 -0.03 0.69 0.84
RC 0.90 0.70 0.10 -0.08 0.50 0.17 -0.02 0.84
SN 0.95 0.87 0.06 -0.05 0.04 0.17 -0.07 0.16 0.93
Int 0.97 0.82 0.27 0.19 -0.25 0.64 0.60 -0.13 0.22 0.91  
Key: Perceived Severity (PS); Perceived Vulnerability (PV); Response Efficacy 
(RE); Self-Efficacy (SE); Maladaptive Rewards (MR); Response Cost (RC); 
Subjective Norm (SN); Intention (Protection Motivation (INT) 
Note: The square root of the AVE for each construct is shown on the 
diagonals, and the correlations among the constructs on the off-diagonals. 
 
For the structural model, attention is paid to the 
R2 values (i.e. coefficient of determination) and path 
coefficients [23]. The R2 value signals the goodness 
of fit of the model; the higher the R2 value, the 
greater the fit, and the better the model will represent 
the data collected [24]. The results (Figure 2) showed 
an R-square value of 0.582 suggesting the model 
explained a moderate to substantial proportion of the 
variance observed for protection motivation [23]. 
 
Perceived 
Severity
Perceived 
Vulnerability
Response
Efficacy Self-Efficacy
Response 
Cost
Subjective Norms
Protection 
Motivation
(Intention)
R2 = 0.582
Threat Appraisal
Coping Appraisal
0.210*
Maladaptive 
Reward
 
Key: *** P≤0.001; ** p≤0.01; * P≤0.05; ns = Not Supported 
Figure 2. The Results 
For threat appraisal, the results (Figure 2) showed 
that maladaptive rewards (-0.262, p≤0.025) was 
strongly related to intention; H3 was supported, 
However perceived vulnerability (0.163, p=0.124) 
and perceived severity (0.000) were not significant in 
relation to intention; H1 and H2 were not supported. 
Turning to the coping appraisal, response efficacy 
(0.390, p≤0.003) and self-efficacy (0.304, p≤0.015) 
were both significant predictors of intention, whilst 
response cost (-0.078) was not. H4 and H5 were 
supported, but not H6. Subjective norms was also 
significant (0.210, p≤0.014), supporting H7.  
6. Discussion 
 
As more individuals are using their home 
computers and laptops for both work and personal 
use, a large amount of sensitive information is 
constantly being stored and exchanged on their 
devices [1]. Due to the increase in the potential for 
security breaches to occur with personal devices, it is 
important that people take steps to secure their 
devices beyond the base level of security that comes 
with each device. Indeed many breaches occur 
because of simple oversights on the users’ part (e.g. 
using weak passwords, using the same passwords 
across multiple devices or applications, downloading 
applications from unknown sources, etc.) As such, 
the aim of our study was to determine what motivates 
persons to implement additional security measures on 
their home computers and laptops. 
Contrary to prior studies [9, 13, 14, 16], the 
results showed that neither perceived vulnerability 
nor perceived severity were significant in relation to 
intention to implement additional security measures 
on home computers and laptops. The insignificant 
relationships for perceived severity and perceived 
vulnerability in relation to intention were not only 
inconsistent with the PMT, but also contrary to 
studies of security behaviors both in the workplace 
[5, 14], and at home [6, 13, 15, 11, 19]. An 
explanation for this inconsistency may be due to the 
threat appeal not being manipulated unlike Boss et al. 
[14] who found that a higher threat appeal led to a 
protective response, while a low threat appeal had 
less impact on intention.  
The significant relationship between maladaptive 
rewards and intention is consistent with the findings 
of Boss et al. [14] and Vance et al. [5], suggesting 
that higher rewards would reduce intention to take 
extra steps to secure one’s devices. Coupled with the 
non-significance of the perceived severity and 
perceived vulnerability, this finding is concerning as 
maladaptive rewards can further lower the level of 
the threat appraisal, such that persons do not feel it is 
necessary to take additional measures to protect their 
devices even if they believe these would protect their 
devices from potential harm (response efficacy) and 
they are capable of taking these steps (self-efficacy).  
For the coping appraisal, the results identified 
response efficacy and self-efficacy as moderate 
predictors of intention to implement additional 
security measures on home computers. This is 
consistent with prior studies of home users [2, 6, 11, 
15, 17, 19] and in the work place [9, 14]. Contrary to 
expectations [13], response costs did not have a 
significant impact on the protection motivation. 
However, this is consistent with some studies that 
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have likewise found an insignificant relationship in 
organizations [9] and in home settings Menard et al. 
[17]. 
Altogether the results have implications for 
practice, in particular those who are responsible for 
promoting internet safety and cybersecurity among 
the public. The results show that what others think 
(i.e. subjective norms) coupled with coping appraisal 
(i.e. response efficacy and self-efficacy) are strong 
motivators for people to take protective actions. On 
the other hand, a low threat appraisal whether valid o 
not, will lessen the motivation to take protective 
actions. In addition, if the ‘reward’ of not taking 
protective actions (e.g. saving time, preventing 
confusion) is high enough this will further lessen the 
motivation to take protective actions. To motivate 
action, it is important to overcome the appeal of 
‘maladaptive rewards’ by educating home computer 
users of their vulnerability to and potential severity of 
a security breach; high fear-appeal messages may 
serve to heighten the threat appraisal and motivate 
people to action [14].  
It is further recommended that home users are 
provided with checklists and ‘how-to’ guides on 
additional security measures they should take to 
minimize risk; these can range from simple 
precautions (e.g. using strong passwords) to more 
sophisticated measures such as adjusting the default 
settings on their browser. Even if people are not 
confident to take very involved steps (or the costs are 
perceived as too high), the simple steps would go a 
long way to improve the security of home devices.  
Consistent with prior research [9, 20], the results 
also highlighted the importance of social circles (e.g. 
family, friends) which can have a strong impact on 
protection motivation. Promoting the benefits and 
uptake of computer security measures through public 
education and awareness (See www.netsafe.org.nz), 
may further motivate people to adopt these measures.  
 
6.1. Limitations  
 
Notwithstanding the contributions of this study, 
there are some limitations that impact the findings 
and provide opportunities for future work. First this 
study was conducted in New Zealand; here there are 
many organizations that aim to ensure and educate 
the public about network and internet safety and 
security. As such, the findings may not apply in other 
countries where, for example, general internet or 
network safety is seen by the general public as a 
significant issue. Second, we did not test a 
comprehensive model of protection motivation. 
Future study may wish to extend the current model 
by including other factors such as fear, attitude and 
descriptive norms that may also impact behavior [2, 
14]. The current sample of 72 responses though 
small, was enough to assess the model [23]. Given 
the number of weak or insignificant relationships 
(e.g. perceived vulnerability, perceived severity, 
response cost) it is expected that a greater number of 
responses may make smaller significances detectable, 
and shed more light on the predictors of intention.  
 
7. Conclusion  
 
This research focused on the implementation of 
additional security measures on home computers and 
laptops. While most studies have focused on 
organizational settings or the general perceptions of 
home users about security measures as a whole, this 
study recognizes that newer computers and software 
include a base level of security (e.g. Microsoft 
Essentials), that require little or no user action. 
However, this is not enough, and there are many 
steps, ranging from simple to more complex 
measures, that people can take to improve the 
security of their home device. This study therefore 
focused on the additional measures that people can 
take to secure their devices to identify what would 
encourage people to take these extra steps. By 
distinguishing these additional measures (e.g. not 
sharing passwords), this study contributes to the 
literature and to practice by understanding better, 
peoples’ motivations to go beyond the basics to 
ensure the safety of their personal computing devices.  
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